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The present paper is the summary of my views on imaginative symbols in the aspects of their semantic structure and conceptual transpositions in them. As was defined in one of my earlier works, symbol is a multi-notion conventional sign which represents, apart from its inherent and immediate designatum, an essentially different, usually more abstract designatum, connected with the former by a logical link. (Shelestiuk 1997: 125)1
H. V. Shelestiuk
Shelestiuk, Helen V. Semantics of Symbol // Semiotica. Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. Vol. 144-1/4, 2003. Pp. 233-259.
The present paper is the summary of my views on imaginative symbols in the aspects of their semantic structure and conceptual transpositions in them. As was defined in one of my earlier works, symbol is a multi-notion conventional sign which represents, apart from its inherent and immediate designatum, an essentially different, usually more abstract designatum, connected with the former by a logical link. (Shelestiuk 1997: 125)1 In semantic terms, in symbols we deal with a hierarchy of meanings, where the direct meaning constitutes the first layer of sense and serves as a basis for the indirect (secondary) meaning - the second layer of sense, both of them united under the same designator (a name, a visual image, a significant object or person, etc.)
In (Shelestiuk 1997) I discussed the indispensable characteristics of symbols, which are, in fact, the complex structure of a symbol and the equally important status of meanings in it. Other important, if not indispensable, features of symbols are: imaginativeness; motivation; immanent polysemy; archetypal nature; integration into the structure of secondary semiotic systems and universality in various cultures. I will not dwell here on each of these features, but regard some of them as I outline the essentials of the theory of symbols.
There may be more than one secondary concept associated with the immediate designatum in symbol. This feature is termed immanent polysemy in (Shelestiuk 1997); Philip Wheelwright (1968: 220) seems to mean the same when he speaks of ambiguity and vagueness of symbols. Immanent polysemy of a symbol means its innumerable implications: a cluster of conceptually disparate meanings related to a symbol (for example, fire – hearth and home; masculine principle; passion; the sun; purification); a circle of equonymous meanings (fire – purification – funeral pyre, purgatory, Gehenna); or a sense perspective - a chain of meanings, where, as the thought moves away from the direct meaning, links of abstract metaphors / metonymies may be followed by links of their concrete realization in other domains (fire - vigor - masculine principle - fertilization; fire – passion - heart; fire - the sun – God - spirit).
Among symbols I specify language and speech symbols. Language symbols are fixed in people’s mind as stable associative complexes, existing in the lexical meaning of a word as ‘a symbolic aura’, i. e. a number of semes of cultural-stereotype and archetypal or mythological character. Cultural-stereotype symbols are contemporary and comprehensible for all the representatives of a culture, with a transparent logical connection between a direct and a secondary meaning, the latter being easily deducible. Archetypal symbols, consistent with K. G. Jung’s archetypes, are symbols based on the most ancient or primary ideas of the ambient world. In archetypes the connection between the direct and secondary meaning is often darkened.
Examples of cultural stereotypes: e.g. rose – beauty, love; wall – obstacle, restriction of freedom, estrangement; mountain – spiritual elevation, also courage associated with overcoming difficulties; way – movement in time, progress, course of life. Examples of archetypes: the sky – father; the earth – mother; egg - primordial embryo, out of which the world developed; snake - god of the underground world, of the dead; bird – mediator between the earth and the heaven, this world and the other world; tree (of life), mountain (of life) – the world itself.
Unlike language symbols, speech symbols are variables, rather than constants. Here the direct meaning of a word is used to denote the author’s subjective, individual ideas. Thus, in literature the cultural-stereotype and archetypal contents of a word are specifically interpreted.
For example, the archetypal meaning of the river is linear time of human life, where the source is the world of souls, the middle part is the course of earthly life, and the lower reaches are the world of the dead. The archetypal meaning of the sea is primordial chaos, the world before creation, the abode of the creator or many deities, the eternal cycle of birth and death (interpretations from the second volume of (Tokarev 1988: 374, 249)). These archetypal meanings are originally transformed by T. S. Eliot in ‘The Dry Salvages’ to elaborate on his idea of time, measured by human life, and the infinity, and on the dialectic of human ‘microcosm’ and ‘macrocosm’ around him (‘the river is within us, the sea is all about us’). (Arinstein 1984: 268)
Another example: the cultural-stereotype meaning of wall - obstacle, restriction of freedom, barrier, estrangement - in ‘Mending Wall’ by Robert Frost is transformed into prejudices based on the primitive instinct of self-preservation.
The most interesting cases in literature are conceptual (metaphysical) symbols, arbitrary (hypothetical) symbols and hermetic (esoteric) symbols, specific to the literary current of symbolism.
Conceptual symbols are recurrent images of an individual author embodying certain philosophic ideas, which build up his picture of the world, such as T. S. Eliot’s the waste land, the hollow men, W. B. Yeats’ Byzantium, Wallace Stevens’ cry, E. E. Cummings’ now and others.
Arbitrary symbols are those which admit of numerous interpretations owing to too broad a context or to a high stochasticity factor in a text.2 For example, the symbol of a blackbird from Wallace Stevens’ ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ admits of at least 13 interpretations, and even so, the context of each of the thirteen stanzas is insufficient for its unambiguous treatment.
Hermetic (esoteric) symbols are conventional signs, understood only by the few with pertinent knowledge of a code. Such symbols were characteristic, for instance, of medieval alchemy. With respect to literature they are part and parcel of symbolism – the literary trend which sought to evoke through symbols, understood by the initiated, subtle relations and affinities between the material and spiritual worlds. Many symbols of W. B. Yeats are hermetic, as in ‘The Second Coming’, where hawks and falcons (primitive instincts) hide the moon (ancient civilization, intellect) and herald the rise of a new civilization (the interpretation is from (Brooks 1977)).
To understand the three above-mentioned types of symbols to the fullest one must look into the correlation of the author’s individual thesaurus with his world outlook, in other words, call into play what was termed ‘paradigmatic context’ by Tzvetan Todorov (1982).
As a specific sign symbol implies the combination of structural-semantic and dynamic (nominative) features, the latter referring to the process of symbolization.
Structurally, symbol is a multi-notional complex sign. There is a minimum of two equally important kernels in it. The direct meaning is the image of a symbol. It denotes a concrete notion, which is nevertheless generalized to provide a basis for further abstractions. The figurative meaning is the idea of a symbol. It is different from the direct meaning in quality and may be archetypal, cultural-stereotype or individual and subjective.
The dynamic (nominative) aspect in a symbol – symbolization - may be defined as semantic transposition, which implies the transfer from a sign in praesentia to a sign in absentia. In other words, the name of an object is transposed onto an absent sign denoting a qualitatively different notion. This transposition is due to the fact that the immediate designatum itself induces the secondary designatum on the basis of apparent or conventional associations between notions. In original symbols, however, the secondary designatum is implied by the immediate designatum as seen through the prism of the context, whereby some features of the immediate designatum are ascribed to the secondary designatum.
From the perspective of symbolization as a process I specify metaphor and metonymy as the fundamental mechanisms of transposition. If symbol is viewed as a static sign, metonymy and metaphor reveal themselves as the fundamental types of logical connections between meanings by their obligate or potential characteristics. Metaphor suggests similarity of meanings. Metonymy, as I broadly see it, embraces all types of logical connections except similarity. It includes, among others, synecdoche and hypo-hyperonymic transposition. Metaphor and metonymy form up peculiar associative rows of meanings, which possess certain logic, so the resultant symbols are semantically and conceptually consistent.
Metaphoric and metonymic connections in symbols will be discussed at length in the parts of this paper where the distinction is drawn between symbols and tropes and where the classification of symbols is presented. Below I will dwell on some other important types of interaction between meanings or between form and meanings in symbol, or mechanisms of symbolization for that matter.
Some symbols have no logical links between their designata. They may result from synaesthesia, from primitive syncretism of notions, from connections between form and meaning (sound symbolism) and from erroneous association of notions owing to accidental coincidence of forms of words (paronymous, homonymous or polysemous symbols).
Synaesthesia is association of primary perceptions of different modalities (hearing, sight, sense of touch, sense of smell and sense of taste) on the basis of their intensity, emotional coloring and evaluation. In terms of traditional linguistics synaesthesia is transposition of a name of a characteristic to another characteristic on the basis of similar connotations - intensity, emotional coloring and evaluation (e.g. mild cheese, mild light, mild voice; loud voice, loud color; rough food, rough country, rough sound; a rotten egg, apple, rotten weather, he is a rotten driver, to feel rotten etc.). Besides, there often occurs synaesthesic transposition of physical perceptions to mental and emotional phenomena (loose hair, loose behavior; strong man, strong criticism; an open house, open contempt, an open man; to seize a hand, to seize an idea, to seize power).
In symbols synaesthesia appears as a transposition of a name of an object onto a concept on the basis of similarity or contiguity of connotations of the immediate and secondary designata. A few examples of synaesthesic symbols: ‘rose – love, happiness’; ‘day – life, joy, God’; ‘night – mystery, death, danger, evil’. Synaesthesia is seldom the only link between meanings in symbols, more often, it co-occurs with other connections.
Synaesthesia may be metaphoric, based on similarity of connotations of notions, which do not directly imply each other, e.g. in the symbols ‘the rose-garden – love; paradise’ (similarity of evaluation), ‘the rising lotos – growth of spirit’ (similarity of evaluation) from ‘Burnt Norton’ by T. S. Eliot, ‘night – death’ (similarity of emotion) from ‘Ode to the Confederate Dead’ by Allen Tate and ‘Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night’ by Dylan Thomas.
Synaesthesia may also be metonymic, based on contiguity of notions, which means that notions actually imply each other. In this case connotations (emotion, evaluation and intensiveness of some property) are also implied by the immediate designatum, and either constitute the secondary designatum itself or are attendant to it. For example, in the symbol ‘the valleys – passiveness, inertia, stagnation’ from ‘Paysage Moralise’ by W. H. Auden there is an implication of emotional states from some features of a locality, viz. steadiness, evenness, immutability. In the symbol ‘the mountains – mystery, a promise of a better life, a hope’ from the same poem emotional states are implied by some characteristics of mountains, viz. remoteness, height, obstruction of perspective, difficulty of access, beauty.
Sound symbolism is association of a sound cluster with sensuous phenomena of modalities other than aural perception (e.g. flutter, flicker, shimmer, glimmer, glitter, gloat, glow, twinkle, twist, snatch, snap, bloody, blithering, fidget, fumble, dilly-dally, shilly-shally, etc.).
Sound symbolism was especially important at the earliest stages of language development and, alongside with sound imitation, was the basis for primary nomination. According to Edward Tylor a word in a primitive society is a totem substituting various notions. So alongside with mythical ideas, in which speech followed imagination, there were cases where speech preceded and imagination followed it (Tylor 1989: 214). In primitive societies the multivalent symbolism of a sound form was combined with its semantic development in the framework of mythological thinking, so that all the designata of one and the same word were symbols of each other. This process was called bricolage by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1994); the resulting phenomenon may be termed syncretism of meanings.
According to Mark M. Makovsky (1996), the first words in human language were the words based on the proto-Indo-European stem *uer- (*er-), also with preflexes - *ker-,*mer-,*qer-, *ser-, etc. Thus, I.-E. *uer- (*er-) ‘make sounds, speak’ is due to sound imitation, cf. Engl. word, Rus. урчать. On the other hand, I.-E. *uer- (*er-) ‘turn, tie up’ is probably due to sound symbolism1: cf. Goth. waúrms ‘snake’, Engl. worm, whirl, wriggle, wring, wry, wrong - ‘twisting the mouth’, Rus. вертеть, вернуть, вращать, веревка, врать. Owing to bricolage there arose other incompatible meanings of this stem: *uer- ‘wet, water’ (the sound imitation of purling; also the metaphor ‘twisting - braiding of waters’); *uer-men ‘time’ (metaphor with a multiple ground, cf. Rus. время; also *ar-, *uer- ‘fire, burn’); *uer- ‘have, take’, and others.
In our time, one of the chief domains of sound symbolism is poetry, especially, modernistic poetry, where words are separated from, or have a weakened referential meaning. A poet uses them in the same way as an artist uses paints and a musician uses notes, i. e. to create a certain emotional state, a mood. To illustrate this idea let me cite a few lines from “ The Preludes” by Conrad Aiken:
What is the flower? It is not a sigh of color,
Suspiration of purple, sibilation of saffron,
Nor aureate exhalation from the tomb. (Matthiessen 1950: 867)
Symbols based on accidental coincidence of word forms are termed ‘erroneous’, because they usually emerge as a result of confusion. Such kind of symbolism is due to language polysemy, homonymy and paronymy, when two meanings are bound in a complex because of the identity or similarity of their designators. Symbols of this kind mostly belong to the domain of the subconscious, of dreams and deliriums. The famous example of paronymic symbolization is in the legend about Alexander of Macedonia, who dreamt about a satyr dancing on his shield on the night before the seizure of Tyros. An ancient Greek interpreter explained it as a transformation of the sentence ‘Sa Tyros’ (Tyros is yours) into the image of a satyr (satyros). Hypothetically, wordplay or calembour symbols may also occur in admass culture and some forms of art.
In this part of the study attention will be focused on the mainstream symbols, i.e. ‘logical’ symbols based on similarity and contiguity of meanings. I choose the principle of comparison of ‘logical’ symbols with the main tropes, metaphor and metonymy, as the optimum solution for the demonstration of structural and nominative patterns in symbols.
The following essential features of symbol determine its resemblance to the main tropes – metaphor and metonymy.
The differences between symbols and tropes lie:
The differences between symbols and tropes need some clarification, therefore I shall dwell on each of them.
Firstly, symbol and trope are different in the functions they perform, the main function of symbols being representational, and the main functions of tropes – descriptive (characterizing) and aesthetic.
The main function of all symbols, including symbols of art and literature, is that of representation. Other functions of symbol are: epistemic, inasmuch as through symbols one cognizes the essence and the ideal meaning of material things; communicative, inasmuch as a symbol communicates an implicit fact or ideal sense; magical, inasmuch as a symbol substitutes the esoteric and the tabooed. The aesthetic function, meaning expressiveness and satisfying the sense of the beautiful, is less prominent with symbols than with tropes.
For example, the symbols of three trees and a white horse with Christian semantics from ‘Journey of the Magi’ by T. S. Eliot do not themselves impart any artistic ornamentalism to the text. The same is true for the symbols ‘greenhouse – the Universe, paradise on earth’ by Theodore Roethke, ‘wall – estrangement and hostility’ from ‘Mending Wall’ by Robert Frost, ‘golden bough – happiness and immortality’ from ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ by W. B. Yeats, ‘woods – non-existence, death’ from ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening’ by Robert Frost and for the majority of other symbols from Anglo-American poetry of the XX century taken ad arbitrium, unless they are combined with tropes or used in an imaginative context. One may assume from the above that the connotative component of meaning in symbols plays a less important role than its signification (sense).
The main function of original tropes is to describe or characterize the tenor through the vehicle, rather than represent it. Then, as a special type of imagery, which is ‘the language and speech’ of such secondary semiotic systems as art and literature, tropes invariably fulfil the communicative function. Finally, the aesthetic function is of primary importance in the case of original tropes, since their aim is to make an aesthetic impact on the reader through artistic comparison of different objects and phenomena, properties or actions. The connotative component of meaning is strongly pronounced in tropes.
The descriptive and aesthetic functions are all-important in expressive (‘ornamental’) and significative (‘conceptual’, ‘meaningful’) tropes. These functions are quite obvious for expressive tropes, e.g. ‘you…would like to sleep on a mattress of easy profits’ ( Louis McNeice, from (Roberts 1964: 46)), ‘snail, snail, glister me forward’ (Theodore Roethke, from (Roberts 1970: 211)), ‘O small dust of the earth that walks so arrogantly’ (Marianne Moore, from (Matthiessen 1950: 774)), ‘the circuit calm of one vast coil’ (Hart Crane, from (Jimbinov 1983: 264), ‘her smile...is all that our haggard folly thinks untrue’ (John Masefield, from (Arinstein 1984: 190)), etc.
In the case of significative tropes the vehicle is prominent in the text as a unit of philosophical or allegorical discourse, wherefore significative tropes are often confused with symbols. Yet, the vehicle in them fulfils a descriptive (characterizing), rather than representational function. For example, in Ted Hughes’ ‘The Thought-Fox’, where throughout the poem the actions of a fox figuratively describe the movement of creative thought, we identify an extended simile or, perhaps, an allegory, but hardly a symbol.
With regard to their main function – representational – symbols bear more similarity to linguistic, etymological metaphors and metonymies and set phrases, which are fixed in the linguistic system, rather than to original tropes. In linguistic tropes and set phrases, as well as in symbols, the sign together with the etymon (‘the inner form’) represents the figurative meaning.
Secondly, the direct meaning of a symbol is realistic in the context of a piece of poetry, it actually exists, and it is not simply like something else, but it actually means something else. In other words, there are no semantic markers of an imaginary or assumed character of the immediate designatum of a symbol. In this respect compare the fictional ‘woods’ in the metaphor ‘He stepped into the dark woods of death’ and the realistic woods as the symbol of death in ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening’ by Robert Frost.
The direct context, which corresponds to the source domain in terms of cognitive linguistics (as in (Lakoff 1992)), is realistic and as important for the cognition of a symbol as the indirect context (the target domain). So immediate designata make up the material world in a symbolic work and secondary designata represent its ideal meaning.
For example, the blackbird in Wallace Stevens’ ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ has the markers of the realistic character of its immediate designatum in the direct context: ‘the only moving thing was the eye of the blackbird’, ‘the blackbird flew out of sight’. Parallel to this there is a polyvalent indirect context (target domain), where this image is unrealistic, metaphorical, for example ‘I was of three minds, like a tree in which there are three blackbirds’. The poetic lines are quoted from (Jimbinov 1983: 268).
The two contexts, one of which emphasizes the reality of the blackbird and the other actualizes its abstract sense, make it possible to treat this image as a symbol. The blackbird – a bird of a conspicuous color - symbolizes here the revealed, the outward, nature mysteriously related to the covert, the human, consciousness.
The immediate designatum of a symbol is realistic even in a fantastic poetic picture. For example, in the description of a trip to the unrealized past from ‘Burnt Norton’ (‘Four Quartets’) by T. S. Eliot the images of the rose-garden, the pool ‘filled with water out of sunlight’ and the lotos have no markers of fiction or illusion. This imagery is realistic in a fantastic context, in the dimension of ‘another world’. It is precisely as realistic and referential images that they become symbols: the rose-garden - of love and happiness, the pool – of vivifying divine power, the lotos – of purity and spiritual growth. Since they are not metaphors, but symbols, their immediate designata are not mere vehicles of some abstract meaning, but have an equally important status for the general grasp of sense as their secondary designata.
In poetic metaphors the immediate designatum of an image is unrealistic, and so is the direct context itself. It serves as a vehicle to carry the actual sense (the figurative meaning, the tenor). This feature is evident, first of all, in ‘ornamental’ metaphors, where the vehicle characterizes the tenor or specifies some of its features, like ‘the burning of his wreathed bays’ (Ted Hughes), ‘the vast walls of night stand erect to the stars’ (Robinson Jeffers) or ‘the craggy presence of a peasant king’ (Brynlyn Griffiths).