Phonetic coincidence and semantic differentiation of homonyms

 

      D.A. Cruse's (1996) explains the difference between 6, 7 and 8 in terms of facets. Bank refers to an object with at least three facets : the premises, the personnel, the institution. The advantage is that an intermediary semantic level has been introduced between the object and the contextual meanings, which allows for a distinction between real polysemy (the facets) and contextual variations (the usages of each facet). Problems with this theory include the number of facets (can it be precisely stated?) and their discreteness (to what extent do they overlap?). For example, in I hate this bank, which facet is concerned? Is it the personnel or the institution, or even the building?

 

      G. Kleiber (1999) has put forward a referential theory called integrated metonymy whereby under certain conditions a part of an object can stand for the whole. For example, let us consider The Americans landed on the moon, and My trousers are dirty. Both sentences are true although not all Americans landed on the moon, and my trousers may only be stained.  Some Americans stand for the whole nation; one stain on only one small part of the trousers is enough to think of the whole as being dirty.

 

      These theories are all theories of metonymy. They aim to explain how we are able with a single word to focus on the many parts of an object, or to the object as a whole, or to some entity linked to the object. The answers basically rest on a very ordinary feature of thought: selecting one aspect of an object in particular does not exclude the other aspects and the whole. They remain in the background. If one polishes the piano, it does not mean that it ceases to be a music instrument, and vice-versa. When book is "coerced" into an event, it remains an object [21:342].

 

Lexical polysemy. This is what the layman has in mind when he thinks of polysemy. How come operation can refer to two very different things such as a surgical and a military operation? How come we have the feeling that their meanings are somehow linked ?

 

The evidence in section 3 can be separated into two subsets, according to whether or not we are able to trace a metaphorical or metonymical link between usages.

 

• Metonymical and metaphorical links. In the subset below, some of the senses are clearly derived from others, and we are able to identify the original meaning. For example senses 3 and 4 of door can be lumped together because they both refer to the same object (the object door). We then consider them in relationship to usage 5, where door is clearly not a physical object but some abstract concept meaning opening or channel. The door usage in 5 is clearly a metaphor. We do not doubt for a minute that the physical meaning comes first and the abstract meaning is second. Here is a list of such lexical polysemy in the corpus :

 

door  3, 4 :  physical object

      5 :  channel, opening :     metaphor

 

bank  6, 7, 8: physical object

      9 :  Monopoly :      metaphor

      10 :  store something :     metaphor

 

     work  19 :  physical object

      20 :  humans work => machines work :   metaphor

      21 : change things =>change s.o. :   metaphor

 

book  22, 23: physical object

24 :  accounts are written down in books:  metonymy

      25 :  one’s name is written in a book :   metonymy

 

• No obvious metonymical or metaphorical links

position :  14 (physical), 15 (social), 16 (psychological)

resist :   17 (German aushalten), 18 (German widerstehen)

 

The position example has already been mentioned. The case is even stronger with resist, where it is certainly impossible to say which meaning is literal and which is derived.

 

• Comparison

 

Group 1 : One is able to trace a historical link between usages. Some word (for example bank) first refers to some object (for example the financial institution), and then some other object is referred to by the same name because of some resemblance with the first object (for example blood bank). It is impossible, or difficult, or artificial to conjure up a subsuming entity here (for example something subsuming bank and blood bank).

 

Group 2 : We are unable to trace the history of the word, or we are not certain. We could make up a theory, for example that the physical meaning of position came first, then the psychological meaning (a position in the mind), and then the sociological meaning (a position in society), but the link is clearly not obvious. We do not doubt that blood bank has a metaphorical link with bank; we are not so sure with position, and at a loss with resist. We feel there is a link, but not a horizontal one, rather a vertical one, a subsuming link, of which the usages of position and resist are only exemplars.

 

There is a strong case for a subsuming theory here. The aim of this paper is to offer a referential explanation of the phenomenon, whereby the subsuming entity is not cause, but consequence of usage [22:3-8]

 

A referential explanation of  the subsuming hypothesis

 

      Suppose we make use of a word,  position for example, in reference to different types of objects, for example the physical, psychological and sociological positions. These objects are somehow lumped together by the fact that they are referred to by the same word (position). But beyond a shared signifier, we infer that these objects also share some intrinsic property,  which the signifier is able to select.

 

Suppose p stands for position, c for crouched, s for Soviet, j for job, and x for any property a position cannot normally have, for example blue. Then,

      if p(c) and p(s) and p(j) but not p(x)   (with x = blue for example)

      then c, s, j (but not x) share some element (e)

      and p has the capacity to select element (e)

 

Element (e) is thus endowed with some separate existence. But it has to be noted that it is very difficult to put words on element (e): what is it exactly that the positions share?

 

      This argument that the subsuming element (of position for example) is consequence of usage, and not cause, is only valid synchronically of course: the subsuming element (e) is construed by speakers of existing words. Diachronically, the subsuming element can be the cause of a new usage, if its first user believes that some new entity is endowed with that element. If other speakers agree, it becomes a neologism. Yet the fact remains that the subsuming element can only be produced by usage. The alternative view is untenable. It would mean that referring is a matter of mapping objects, as they appear to our consciousness, on a pre-determined semantic content of the lexicon. In other words, it would mean that our referring activity is caused by intrinsic features of some sort of genetic lexicon waiting in our brains to name objects. When someone first used free in connection with electron, they probably did so because it seemed an unbound electron shared something with other unbound objects, not because the meaning of free was there expecting scientist to discover electrons. When someone named the pointing device of a computer after the rodent, they did so because the thing looked like a mouse, not because the meaning of mouse made it possible.

 

      Our usage-based theory rests on two premises, which will be presently put to the test.

1. Words have us surmise that the objects they refer to are somehow related

2. The subsuming entity is deduced from  usage, it is not cause of usage [23:46].

 

• Premise 1

 

If "words have us surmise that the objects they refer to are somehow related", then objects referred to by different words should not be obviously related, even if they are objectively close. Resist is used with two different meanings in examples 17 and 18: 

- resist1: some object resists the effect of some potentially dangerous object

- resist2: someone resists someone

 

      In German there are two words for these meanings of resist: aushalten (17) and  widerstehen (18). The dictionary offers two separate entries and mentions no link between them. My native speaking informants of  German confirm: aushalten and widerstehen share no semantic element whatsoever. Yet for English speakers resist1 and resist2 do share something. Now fight off, endure and ward off can be considered as semantically close to resist, at least closer than eat and sleep.  The difference between resist1 and resist2 is probably not greater than between them and  respectively endure and fight off (or ward off), and yet resist1 and resist2 seem to be more obviously related than resist2 and ward off for example. Thus, if objects are not referred to by the same word, we do not surmise an obvious relation between them.

 

      Another example is the German word Schuld, which means debt, fault, responsibility and guilt.  Do German speakers believe there is an intrinsic link between debt and guilt, at least more so than speakers of French and English? My informants feel there is, but it would have to be looked into more closely from a cultural point of view.

 

• Premise 2

 

If "a subsuming entity is deduced from usage", how come we do not deduce one from homonyms? This point is examined in the following section.

 

Homonymy. Bank 6, 7 8 have been lumped together because they are referentially polysemic (see section 4.1); we now lump them with their lexical polysemes 9 (Monopoly) and 10 (blood bank), and consider them in relationship with homonyms 11 (a river bank), 12 (a small flat mound) and 13 (an undersea elevation). Here's is a list of the homonyms in the corpus :

 

- bank:  [(6, 7, 8), 9, 10], 11, 12 , 13

- book:  [(22, 23), 24, 25], 26

- voler:  27, 28

- bande:  30, 31, 32

 

If premise 2 is correct, why do we not perceive a link between homonyms, while we do so with polysemes?  Here too an explanation in terms of reference can be put forward, this time in terms of absence of a common reference.

 

a) There was a referential link once but it is forgotten

 

• Bank-mound, bank-financial institution and river bank actually have a common origin, the Gothic word benc, which originally referred to a small mound. Then it was also used  metaphorically for river bank, and also as a metaphor for a low table, especially those where bankers used to exchange money, which gave Italian banca, French banque, and English bank. Bankruptcy originates in banqueroute, i.e. "bank on the road".

 

• Voler originally only meant flying. In the Middle Ages, eagles and falcons were used for hunting. In  L’aigle vole le lapin, voler means to catch. Voler then meant stealing because the act of stealing resembles the way a falcon catches its prey. It is clearly a metaphor. Nowadays, falconry is not practised anymore, except by enthusiasts, and the original link is forgotten. Voler-flying and voler-stealing are considered by most speakers as homonyms.

 

b) The meanings were never related

 

• The three usages of bande in 30, 31, 32 have three different origins. Bande (strip) comes from Gothic binda which means link (see English bind, German binden). Bande (gang) comes from Gothic banda which means flag, standard (see Italian bandera, English banner, French bannière), and then in Italian, a group of soldiers (banda). Bande (list) comes from Provençal banda, which means side.

 

c) Conclusion

 

      So, either the relationship is forgotten because the object which gave birth to the metaphor or the metonymy has disappeared, or there never was one. The difference between polysemy and homonymy can be explained as follows :

1. When a word denotes two or more objects, then we tend to surmise some link between them.

2. When we check the link, we examine the denoted objects. Sometimes we find there is indeed some degree of resemblance (and the words are polysemous), sometimes we do not (and they are homonyms).

 

      According to this view, words are not containers of linguistic or conceptual sub-entities. Single words or phrases happen to be able to denote a variety of objects, sometimes because of  some factual or formal resemblance, sometimes by pure chance. If the resemblance between the objects seems motivated, we tend to consider the referring words as semantically related by a set of sub-entities. If not, we think of them as homonyms.

 

      So the real question is, why do we think there is a resemblance between the Soviet position and a crouched position or between resist1 and resist2, and not between river bank and Bank of England ? This would need quite an exhaustive semiotic and cultural analysis. We live in an ever-changing world of physico-cultural objects loosely connected to an unlimited set of signs : some may refer to the many aspects of an object (referential polysemy), some to a number of resembling objects (lexical polysemy), others to unconnected objects (homonymy). Mankind has kept trying, at least since Aristotle, to organise and comprehend the real world, essentially by matching it with language. Language is a repository of knowledge gained by naming and relating objects. This is why we tend to believe that language and the real world are isomorphic, that language maps the world. It is a fallacy of course: isomorphism is a goal, not a given; it is the stuff of science and philosophy. When words refer to separate objects, we quite naturally believe that the objects and the words must share some features. Yet it fails with homonyms, because of some real world discrepancies or because we have forgotten why our forebears named these objects so. And we wonder: why are these two very different things referred to by the same word? We name the mystery homonymy, and add it to the repository.  Homonymy is disappointed polysemy; we resort to it reluctantly. Most French speakers agree that we could, albeit with some difficulty, construe a semantic resemblance between bande de voleurs and bande de papier. Although they are historically not related at all, they seem to share, very vaguely, a notion of something long, something like a file. If one tries hard enough, one can even come up with a subsuming cognitive element for voler, as was done by S. Ikeda (1995), quoted in (Kleiber 1999). Our preference for polysemy seems very powerful. When no obvious relation between objects is available, we are able to construe one very easily (and often creatively) [24:150].

 
 

Polysemy and homonymy can be entirely explained in terms of reference.

 

• Referential polysemy

Objects (for example a piano) can be viewed from a number of points of view (for example as a music instrument or a piece of furniture). The link between these usages is clearly the object as a whole.

 

• Lexical polysemy

Polysemy is lexical, according to our definition, when words refer to objects which we think of as being somehow related. There are two types of such polysemy :

- linear polysemy, when we are able to trace a linear link, either metonymical or metaphorical, between the original object and a new object named after it (for example mouse-rodent and computer-mouse)

- subsuming polysemy, when usage has created an accepted common subsuming element (as in position and resist).

 

• Homonymy

Words are thought of as homonyms, when the object which once linked two usages has culturally ceased to exist (for example when falconry disappeared, the metaphorical link between the two meanings of voler disappeared too), or when the link itself was forgotten (as between a bank and a low table). In other cases,  objects were never actually related in any way, they just happen to share a signifier (as bande).

 

         In short, the engine of meaning is reference, i.e. our desire to grasp and communicate our experience through language. The real world is not a given. We become aware of it through living in it, being part of it, observing it, naming it, thinking it. The denotation of new objects is not usually a planned business, it just happens. Polysemy and homonymy are the names of ingrained discrepancies in our referring activity: polysemy is referential when one object is linked to several usages of a word; polysemy is lexical when several resembling objects are linked to several usages of a word; the phenomenon is called homonymy  when  several non resembling objects are linked to several usages of a word [25:119-122].

 

     Words borrowed from other languages may through phonetic convergence become homonymous. Old Norse has and French race are homonymous in Modern English (cf. race1 [reis]—'running' and race2 [reis] 'a distinct ethnical stock'). There are four homonymic words in Modern English: sound —’healthy’ was already in Old English homonymous with sound—'a narrow passage of water', though etymologically they are unrelated. Then two more homonymous words appeared in the English language, one comes from Old French son (L. sonus) and denotes 'that which is or may be heard' and the other from the French sunder the surgeon's probe. One of the most debatable problems in semasiology is the demarcation line between homonymy and polysemy, i.e. between different meanings of one word and the meanings of two homonymous words.

     If homonymy is viewed diachronically then all cases of sound convergence of two or, more words may be safely regarded as cases of homonymy as, e.g., sound i, sound2, sound-e, and sound4 which can be traced back to four etymologically different words. /fie cases of semantic divergence, however, are more doubtful. The transition from polysemy to homonymy is a gradual process, so it is hardly possible to point out the precise stage at which divergent semantic development tears asunder all ties of etymological kinship and results in the appearance of two separate words/ In the case of flower, flour,1 e.g., it is mainly the resultant divergence of graphic forms that gives us grounds to assert that the two meanings which originally made up the semantic structure of one word are now apprehended as belonging to two different words.

     Synchronically the differentiation between homonymy and polysemy is wholly based on the semantic criterion. It is usually held that if a connection between the various meanings is apprehended by the speaker, these are to be considered as making up the semantic structure of a polysemantic word, otherwise it is a case of homonymy, not polysemy [26:92].